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Abstract: 
Social-psychological research reveals two opposite ways in which a person can respond to increased 
feelings of uncertainty in decision-making. First, he (or she) may try to reduce his uncertainty by 
searching for more specific information. This leads to less stereotyping and discrimination. Second, he 
may identify more strongly with a salient social group he belongs to (his ingroup, e.g. men). This 
induces him to rely more on stereotypic perceptions and prejudices, and hence to discriminate more 
against an outgroup (e.g. women). This paper develops a microeconomic model that integrates both 
responses in the context of hiring and pay decisions by an employer. The model determines 
simultaneous equilibrium levels of expenditures on screening of job applicants and ingroup 
identification. Increasing competition in the product market makes the employer feel more uncertain 
about his profits, but also raises the opportunity cost of screening expenditures. The latter rise elicits 
substitution of ingroup identification for screening expenditures, and hence enhances discrimination. 
Affirmative action has the opposite effect by raising the marginal benefits of screening expenditures. 
Some experimental and empirical evidence is briefly discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
In the last fifty years a rich literature on discrimination has developed in social psychology 
(see Fiske, 1998; Zanna, 1994; Hewstone, 2002, for overviews). Some basic concepts in this 
literature, like prejudice and stereotyping, have been adopted in economics as well (see, e.g., 
Becker, [1957], 1971; Antonji and Blank, 1999). However, a sizable reservoir of potentially 
interesting findings for economics have remained untapped so far. One particular combination 
of such findings is the following. When a person feels uncertain about things that are 
important for him (or her), such as being able to make a living, he is, under certain 
circumstances, inclined to identify himself more strongly with a salient social group he 
belongs to (his ingroup, e.g. men, natives; see, e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998). In its turn, this 
induces him to rely more on stereotypic perceptions and prejudices, which can lead to more 
discrimination against members of an outgroup (e.g. women, foreigners). 
A striking development in the Western world in which this psychological mechanism 
may have played an important role is that the upsurge of fear of terrorism after September 11, 
2001, seems to have led to more stereotyping and probably more discrimination against 
Muslims in the labor market (“we against them”).1 As quite a different example, agents may 
feel uncertain when they have to survive in an environment of fierce market competition. This 
seems especially relevant for people in former communist countries in their transition towards 
a market economy. The psychological prediction of increasing stereotyping and 
discrimination then is consistent with indications that, e.g. in Russia, the old stereotype that 
men should have a job and women should stay at home has revived, while at the same time 
labor market discrimination against women has increased (Hunt, 1997). Such a phenomenon 
may in particular play a role in relation to competition in the labor market: In regions within 
European countries where unemployment is higher, stereotypic perceptions about the roles of 
men and women tend to be stronger, leading to a larger gender gap in unemployment (Azmat 
et al., 2003). Boone et al. (2003) describe a comparable process in the newspaper-publisher 
industry, where powerful top-management teams become more homogeneous with respect to 
demographic characteristics when competition in the product market strengthens – by hiring 
demographically similar and firing dissimilar team members. 
                                                 
1 For example, in the Netherlands the unemployment among Moroccans rose from 10.1% in 2001 to 
22.3 in 2004, i.e. much more strongly than the unemployment among immigrants in general (from 
6.5% in 2001 to 11.9 in 2004; www.cbs.statline.nl). This may be partially due to dislike of Muslims. 
See also the Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 on hate crime against Muslims in the US. 
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 However, social-psychological research also suggests quite a different kind of 
response to increased feelings of uncertainty. Tiedens and Linton (2001) conducted an 
experimental-psychological study on individual decision-making focusing on the effects of 
uncertainty-related emotions on information processing and stereotyping. They find that 
stronger uncertainty-related emotions lead to a more thorough look at the individual 
information at hand and less reliance on stereotypes. This is the rational type of response that 
an economist could expect.  
Thus, two opposite responses to increased feelings of uncertainty seem possible. This 
raises the question under which conditions one or the other response will occur or dominate. 
To answer this question, this paper builds a microeconomic model that explains both the 
psychological identification mechanism and the ‘economic’ response, and integrates them. It 
is formulated in terms of a simultaneous utility maximization with respect to ingroup 
identification on the one hand and a conventional economic variable on the other hand. The 
model addresses the way in which a risk-averse employer forms his expectation of the relative 
productivities of a number of equally qualified candidates for a position. He may base this 
expectation on individual information from job interviews, hiring tests, etc., but he may also 
use stereotypic information on the average productivities of groups candidates belong to 
(men/women, white/black, etc.). We then consider situations in which the employer starts to 
feel more uncertain about the level of his profits. This is assumed to make the employer more 
(absolutely) risk averse with respect to the uncertainty in his productivity estimates, which 
raises his utility loss due to this uncertainty. This evokes two kinds of response to reduce this 
utility loss. 
First, the employer may spend more money, time and cognitive energy on collecting 
individual information on candidates (cf. Tiedens and Linton). This rise in screening 
expenditure (cf. Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3190) raises the perceived reliability of the 
individual information, and hence induces the employer to give a higher weight to this 
individual information in his productivity estimates (cf. Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 
1977). As a result, the uncertainty in the productivity estimates, and hence the ensuing utility 
loss drops, and less use is made of stereotypic information. However, screening is costly, and 
this may induce the employer to respond to his increased feelings of uncertainty by 
identifying himself more strongly with his ingroup. This creates an “illusion of certainty” with 
respect to perceptions of group characteristics, which makes the employer perceive his 
stereotypic information on the average productivities of the ingroup and the outgroup as more 
reliable. As a result, the perceived uncertainty in the productivity estimates, and hence the 
ensuing utility loss again drops, but now more use is made of stereotypic information. 
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Thus, screening expenditure and ingroup identification are substitute means to reduce 
the perceived uncertainty in the productivity estimates of applicants, and hence the ensuing 
utility loss. The degrees to which screening expenditure or ingroup identification are used by 
the employer to reduce the uncertainty determines whether the use of stereotypic information 
in the productivity estimates will fall or rise. To investigate under which conditions one or the 
other will happen, we derive expressions for simultaneous equilibrium levels of screening 
expenditure and ingroup identification dependent on certain variables. Since social 
identification is more salient in group situations, we assume that the employer is the residual 
claimant in a production team (as in the classic entrepreneurial firm of Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972) most members of which belong to the ingroup of the employer. In such a context the 
employer will easily identify with his ingroup, and hence use this identification to reduce 
uncertainty. This marginal benefit of ingroup identification is assumed to be balanced by a 
marginal cost from less personal identity (“depersonalization”; e.g. Turner, 1984). The 
implied endogenization of ingroup identification represents a novelty of the model.2
A surprising implication of our model is that when the employer becomes more 
uncertain about his profits, and hence more risk averse, screening expenditure unambiguously 
rises, but ingroup identification may rise or fall depending on whether the marginal efficiency 
of screening expenditure in raising the reliability of the individual information is diminishing 
or increasing. In particular, this effect occurs when increasing competition on the supply side 
of the product market lowers profits, and hence raises the risk of bankruptcy. However, lower 
profits also imply a tighter budget for expenditures, and hence raise the opportunity cost of 
screening expenditures. This elicits substitution of ingroup identification for these 
expenditures as a means to reduce uncertainty. For a common power specification of the 
employer’s utility function of profit, the resulting rise in identification is shown to dominate 
the counteracting ‘economic’ effects in leading to a higher use of the stereotypic perception 
for ‘most’ profit levels. Moreover, in the case where there is group discrimination, the 
discrimination coefficient of the employer rises as competition strengthens at sufficiently low 
profit levels. Competition in the product market then raises group discrimination even when 
there are no differences in real productivity distribution and in reliability of individual 
information between the ingroup and the outgroup, so even when discrimination is not 
rational from a profit-maximizing point of view. The counteracting ‘economic’ effects work 
in the same direction as the long-run selection mechanism in Becker’s ([1957], 1971) theory 
                                                 
2 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) give an interesting general analysis of the impact of social identity on 
economic outcomes. However, they treat identity as an exogenous variable. 
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of employer discrimination, according to which employers with a zero discrimination 
coefficient drive employers with a non-zero discrimination coefficient out of the competitive 
product market. However, the psychological effect of competition may work in such a way 
that under competitive pressure even employers with zero discrimination coefficient develop 
a non-zero one over time. This would then imply that not all teams with non-zero 
discrimination coefficient would be driven out of the market. 
Other economic models (e.g., of employee and customer discrimination, search costs, 
statistical discrimination, imperfect competition, self-fulfilling prophecies, gender differences 
in efficiency-wage effects, wage bargaining; see, e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999; Coate and 
Loury, 1993; Haagsma, 1993; Rosén, 2003) are able to explain that discrimination can be 
persistent under strengthening competition in the product market, but only few of them 
predict that discrimination which is not based on differences in real productivity distribution 
or reliability of individual information between groups may even increase under competitive 
pressure.3 More importantly, (almost) all economic models seem to assume that the extents to 
which employers rely on stereotypic perceptions and prejudice do not change when 
competition in the product market increases. Both social-psychological research and the 
empirical evidence mentioned above suggest that reliance on stereotypes and prejudices may 
become stronger when competition intensifies, leading to an increase in discrimination (cf. 
Shleifer, 2004). Therefore, this paper endogenizes reliance on stereotypes and prejudices in a 
microeconomic model integrating social-psychological findings. Also, at the end of the paper 
we review some experimental and empirical evidence4 and consider the impact of affirmative 
action.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II develops the model, which 
simultaneously determines the screening expenditure on a job applicant and identification 
with the ingroup. Section III analyses the implied effects of competition on discrimination. 
Section IV reports some evidence, and Section V makes concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
3 When there is a difference in variance of the productivity distribution or reliability of individual 
information between the ingroup and the outgroup, rising risk aversion as a result of increasing 
competitive pressure will raise discrimination against the outgroup (see Aigner and Cain, 1977; 
Hendricks et al., 2003; see also Cornell and Welch, 1996). However, this is not the kind of mechanism 
that we model in this paper. 
4 We then also shortly explain how increasing labor supply competition can raise discrimination. The 
focus of this paper is on the effects of product supply competition since for this kind of competition it 
is much less obvious that it may raise discrimination than for labor supply competition.. 
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II. The model 
A. Basic assumptions and relations  
Consider a representative firm that produces one homogeneous good and sells it in a 
competitive market. The number of competitors in this market is large so that the firm is a 
price taker, but profits are still positive due to entry barriers. The internal structure of the firm 
is that of a production team one member of which takes decisions on, among other things, 
hiring and pay of new team members (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This employer receives 
the firm’s residual income, i.e. the profit, while the other team members earn fixed wages. 
Most team members belong to a certain ingroup of equally qualified individuals of the 
employer (e.g. men, natives), but new team members can be hired from the ingroup as well as 
the equally qualified outgroup (e.g. women, foreigners). Within these groups marginal team 
productivities qi, i.e. marginal contributions of new team members i to the prevailing team 
production, vary, but between the groups no real differences in the distribution of qi exist 
except for a possible difference in average q . 
The employer has imperfect information about the qi’s in the ingroup and the outgroup 
(but perfect information about other variables). Therefore, he has to form subjective 
expectations  of the qiqˆ i of individual candidate team members from the ingroup and the 
outgroup. On the one hand, to save on search for information on individual productivities, he 
bases this expectation on stereotypic perceptions Sq  of the average marginal team 
productivities q  of the two groups. The perception OSq  of the outgroup differs from the 
perception ISq  of the ingroup. To fix ideas, we assume ISOS qq < , but the model also allows 
for the possibility that ISOS qq >  (see Sec. III.C). These perceptions may be correct or not 
(see Sec. D for more on this). On the other hand, to reduce the uncertainty in his estimates of 
individual productivities, the employer also spends some money, time and cognitive energy 
on collecting information on individual candidates, e.g. by means of hiring tests. Assume that, 
in the perception of the employer, this individual information yields unbiased, but imperfectly 
reliable estimates  of individual qTiq i’s. More specifically, , where uii
T
i uqq += i is a 
normally distributed error term, independent of qi, with zero mean and constant variance 
. Furthermore, for ingroup as well as outgroup members q)(uV i has a prior subjective 
probability distribution, which is normal as well, with mean equal to the stereotypic 
perception Sq  (different for ingroup and outgroup members) and constant variance  
(equal for ingroup and outgroup members). The posterior (subjective) expected value of q
)(qV
i, 
given the individual test estimate , then is: Tiq
 Ti
ST
iii qSqSqqEq )1()|(ˆ −+=≡ , (1) 
where  
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)()(
)(
uVqV
uVS +=  (2) 
(Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977).5 The coefficient ],[ 10S ∈  represents the extent to 
which the team members use their stereotypic perception Sq  in the formation of . Since 
V(u) and V(q) are assumed to be the same for the ingroup and the outgroup, S is the same for 
ingroup and outgroup members. 
iqˆ
 The feature of the individual ’s being partially based on perceived group averages 
implies individual statistical discrimination in hiring and pay. Assuming that the individual 
test estimates  are unbiased not only in the perception of the employer, but also in reality 
(see Sec. III.C about a relaxation of this assumption), taking objective expectations 
conditional on q
iqˆ
T
iq
i in eq. (1) yields 
ii
S
i
S
ii
o qqqSqSqSqqE +−=−+= )()1()|ˆ( .        (3) 
Interpreting deviation  as a measure of positive/negative individual (i.e. 
within-group) discrimination, eq. (3) implies that this measure equals 
iii
o qqqE −)|ˆ(
)( i
S qqS − . Thus, in 
absolute value it is linearly increasing in the extent of stereotyping S.  
  Eq. (3) also implies that outgroup members with the same qi as ingroup members will 
on average have a lower estimated  since iqˆ
ISOS qq <  (Aigner and Cain). Nevertheless, if 
these stereotypic perceptions are correct, i.e. if IIS qq =  and OOS qq = , there is no (between-
)group discrimination since on average for the ingroup as well as the outgroup the individual 
discrimination measure equals 0)( =− qqS S . On the other hand, if at least one of the 
stereotypic perceptions is incorrect, e.g. if OOS qq <  and IIS qq = , we have 0)( <− OSO qqS , 
while 0)( =− ISI qqS , indicating negative group discrimination against the outgroup. This 
group discrimination is then linearly increasing in S as well. Such cases will be made 
plausible and elaborated in Sec. D. 
Product price p times the marginal productivity estimates  determine the labor 
demands for ingroup and outgroup members in a complex way. To keep the model 
sufficiently simple and since we want to link it to Becker’s (1957) model of employer 
discrimination in Secs. II.D and III, we make the following simplifying assumptions with 
respect to the labor markets for ingroup and outgroup members. All firms that compete in the 
product market have the same two job levels with two different wages, which are given to and 
identical across the firms. Ingroup members are employed on the higher job level and 
outgroup members on the lower one. The labor markets for the two job levels are competitive 
iqˆ
                                                 
5 Note that S corresponds to the coefficient γ−1  of average productivity α in eq. (2) of Aigner and 
Cain (1977). 
 6
and in market-clearing equilibrium.6 When the employer wants to hire a new employee, he 
hires the candidate with the highest , g = I, O, where  denotes the market wage 
prevailing for ingroup, respectively outgroup members.
g
i wqp −ˆ gw
7
 For further use we define the perceived reliability RT of the individual information  
as  and the perceived reliability R
T
iq
)(/ uV1 S of the stereotypic information Sq  as an indicator 
of  as . The latter Riq )(/ qV1
S has in fact two components: (i) the reliability of Sq  as an 
indicator of the average productivity of ingroup/outgroup members q  and (ii) the reliability 
of q  as an indicator of individual productivity . This corresponds with a decomposition of 
the prior subjective probability distribution of  around 
iq
iq
Sq  into a first-order distribution of 
 around the stochastic iq q  and a second-order distribution of q  around 
Sq  (Camerer and 
Weber, 1992). Assuming that these two distributions are mutually independent, it follows 
then easily by substitution of wqq S +=  into ii vqq +=  that the total variance  equals 
the first-order variance (assumed independent of i) plus the second-order variance . 
Variance  can be said to represent first-order risk, while  indicates second-order 
risk or ambiguity. 
)(qV
)(vV )(wV
)(vV )(wV
 Rewriting eq. (2) in terms of the perceived reliabilities RS and RT yields the intuitively 
appealing expression 
 TS
S
RR
RS += , (4) 
i.e., the extent to which the team members use their stereotypic perceptions in the formation 
of their productivity expectations equals the perceived reliability of this stereotypic 
information relative to the sum of the reliabilities of the two types of information. The 
following sections will show how RT and RS, and hence S, can change as a result of changes in 
financial-economic and psychological choice variables. 
  
                                                 
6 The two equilibrium wages are determined by equality of downward-sloping labor demands and 
upward-sloping labor supplies for ingroup and outgroup members. The labor demands are based in a 
complex way on the distributions of p times  for ingroup and outgroup members. We do not 
elaborate this here since it is not central to the present paper. 
iqˆ
7 Thus, because of its unreliability, the individual test information on job applicants is only used for 
selection in hiring, but not as a basis for individual variation in wages. Furthermore, there is no 
difference in risk premium for ingroup vs. outgroup members since we assume equal perceived 
variances of  for ingroup and outgroup members.  iqˆ
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B. Screening expenditure 
The perceived reliability of individual information RT is determined by the amounts of money, 
time and cognitive energy that are spent on collecting information on the qi of an individual 
candidate (e.g., by means of a hiring test). We can express all these expenditures in terms of 
one monetary measure by noting that time and cognitive energy have monetary opportunity 
costs given by the revenues from spending time and cognitive energy on the most profitable 
alternative activities. The expenditures of time and cognitive energy can then be measured by 
these monetary opportunity costs and added to the expenditures of money. The resulting total 
expenditures for candidate i are referred to as screening expenditure X (assumed to be the 
same for each candidate; cf. Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3190). This X represents an 
endogenous choice variable of the employer. By raising X the employer can make the 
individual information more reliable, i.e. lower , and hence raise R)(uV T. In its turn, this 
lowers the use of stereotypic information S by virtue of eq. (4). 
 How is X determined by the employer? It is chosen at the level at which the expected 
marginal benefit  of X for the employer is equal to its expected marginal cost . These 
 and  are implied by a general one-period utility function of the employer 
XB XC
XB XC
)(),))]((([),( IUIXUEEIXU Ipa += ΠΠ . (5) 
Here I is identification of the employer with his ingroup. The first term on the right-hand side 
denotes the ex ante (i.e. before screening) expected value of the ex post (i.e after screening) 
expected utility of profit  in the extended team, i.e. including a new team member. Profit 
 is stochastic due to the uncertainty in the q
Π
Π i of a new team member8, and in addition its ex 
post expected value is stochastic ex ante since the individual test estimate  has yet to be 
made. Subutility function  has positive and diminishing marginal utility, implying risk 
aversion (in line with Aigner and Cain, 1977; Hendricks et al., 2003). This assumption may 
be justified by presuming that capital markets work imperfectly and/or that the employer does 
not like the firm to go bankrupt since he is committed to the firm or fears loss of reputation in 
the market of employers from bankruptcy.
T
iq
ΠU
9 The second term  indicates the utility of 
general benefits and costs of I (see next section).
)(IU I
10  
                                                 
8 The productivity of the existing team is assumed to be perfectly predictable because of the 
knowledge of production levels of the existing team in the past (neglecting fluctuations). 
9 Alternatively, risk aversion may be due to a negative dependence of profits on unpredictable 
variation in the qi of team members (cf. Aigner and Cain, 1977, p. 181). 
10 This utility should not be confused with the disutility due to prejudice in Becker’s (1957) theory of 
employer discrimination. See Sec. D for that. 
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 Profit Π  in the extended team depends negatively on screening expenditure X as this 
is part of the total costs of the team. The ‘new’ profit Π  is related to X and the (perfectly 
predicted) profit of the existing team 0Π  as , where qkmXwwpq OIn −−+−+= δ∆ΠΠ 0 n 
is the qi of the new hire, , OI www −≡∆ Oδ  is a dummy equal to 1 when an outgroup member 
is hired and 0 otherwise, m is the number of candidates who are screened, and k is marginal 
capital and other costs. We assume that m is exogenously determined by a limited supply of 
equally best-qualified candidates. Besides its cost, X also has the benefit of lowering  
(see above), and hence of reducing the posterior variance  (assumed to 
be independent of i).
)(uV
)|()|( Tii
T qqVarqqV ≡
11 To make this variance visible, we make a second-order Taylor 
expansion of  around the ex post (i.e. posterior) expected value  of  (as usual in 
risk analysis; see, e.g., Nicholson, 1998, p. 223).
)(ΠΠU Πˆ Π
12 This implies  
 )|()ˆ('')ˆ()]([ T221
p qqVpUUUE ΠΠΠ ΠΠΠ +≅ . (6) 
Considering the ante expected value of this expression, we can approximate  by  
 and  by , where , which is obtained by 
replacing  by its prior expectation 
)]ˆ([ ΠΠUE a
)]ˆ( SU ΠΠ )]ˆ(''[ ΠΠUE a )]ˆ('' SU ΠΠ )ˆ(ˆ ΠΠ aS E≡
nqˆ
Sq  in the expression for Πˆ  as implied by the equation 
for  above eq. (6).Π 13 The prior Sq , and hence SΠˆ , is different for a new team member 
from the ingroup versus the outgroup, but the employer also has an ex ante expectation 
whether he will hire a candidate from the ingroup or the outgroup, dependent on whether 
ISI wqp −  or OSO wqp −  is higher. It then follows that  
)|()ˆ('')ˆ())](([ T2S21
Spa qqVpUUUEE ΠΠΠ ΠΠΠ +≅ . (7) 
Further, making the plausible assumption that total screening expenditures mX are low 
relative to ,  we can approximate  by its first-order Taylor expansion with SΠˆ )ˆ( SU ΠΠ
                                                 
11 Of course, also some expenditure has to be made to select the set of (more or less) equally best-
qualified candidates. This, however, is not included in X. 
12 This is not equivalent to assuming a quadratic specification of  since this Taylor expansion 
is only used as a local approximation of  for 
)(ΠΠU
)(ΠΠU Π  near Πˆ , and hence is still consistent with a 
general utility function . Mutatis mutandis, this holds for the following approximations in this 
section as well. 
)ˆ(ΠΠU
13 These approximations imply that we neglect terms in . This variance indicates the ex ante 
uncertainty in the posterior estimates  since the test estimates  have yet to be made. Using eqs. 
(1) and (2) and 
)ˆ(qV
iqˆ
T
iq
ii
S
ii
T
i uvwquqq +++=+=  ex ante,  can easily be shown to equal . In 
the present context of utility maximizing with respect to X, the second-order Taylor-expansion term in 
 of  can be omitted since it does not depend on X (see the next section for the case 
of I). 
)ˆ(qV )(qV
)ˆ(qV )]ˆ([ ΠΠUE a
 9
respect to  around , and approximate  by , 
yielding 
mX )0|ˆ(ˆ 0 =≡ mXSS ΠΠ )ˆ('' SU ΠΠ )ˆ('' 0SU ΠΠ
 [ ] )|()ˆ('')ˆ(')ˆ())(( 202100 TSSSpa qqVpUmXUUUEE ΠΠΠΠ ΠΠΠΠ +−≅ . (8)  
Since subutility  in eq. (5) does not depend on X, eq. (8) gives an expression for 
maximand . The second term of this expression represents the expected opportunity 
cost of the total screening expenditures  for the employer in terms of utility. The last term 
indicates the ex ante expected utility loss  due to the perceived risk of making 
mistakes in the individual productivity estimates . As indicator of this perceived risk serves 
the posterior conditional variance , which is related to the prior unconditional 
variance  as  (Aigner and Cain, 1977, p. 180). Substituting eq. (4) and 
 into this relation, it follows that  
)(IU I
)(XU
mX
)( UE a ∆
iqˆ
)|( TqqV
)(qV )()|( qSVqqV T =
SR1qV /)( ≡
 . (9)   1TST RRqqV −+= )()|(
Substituting this expression into the formula for the expected utility loss  in eq. (8), 
differentiating utility function (8) to X, and rearranging terms yields the first-order condition 
for an interior utility-maximizing level of screening expenditure X* 
)( UE a ∆
 mUXRXRRpU STTSS )ˆ('*)('*))((|)ˆ(''| 0
22
02
1 ΠΠ ΠΠ =+ − , (10)  
where RT is a function  with . The left-hand side of this condition 
represents the expected marginal benefit  at X* for the employer of higher screening 
expenditures per candidate X. It is given by the ex ante expected reduction of the utility loss 
)(XRT 0XRT >)('
XB
U∆ . The right-hand side of condition (10) shows the expected marginal cost  at X* of a 
higher X as the expected marginal disutility of screening expenditures . As a result of the 
first-order Taylor expansion (8) for ,  is constant. The second-order condition 
for an interior X* then implies that  must be falling at X*. This holds if and only if 
 (see App. A), i.e.  should not be too 
positive. Note that positive as well as negative values of  are consistent with 
diminishing marginal reduction in variance  as X rises.
XC
mX
S
0mX Πˆ<< XC
XB
1TS2TT XRRXR2XR −+< *))((*)('*)('' *)('' XRT
*)('' XRT
)(uV 14 Making the plausible 
assumption that there is a unique interior X* that fulfils the first- and second-order conditions, 
it follows that changes in exogenous variables Z that raise/lower  ceteris paribus lead to a 
higher/lower X*, while changes that raise/lower  ceteris paribus lead to a lower/higher X*. 
This implies: 
XB
XC
 
                                                 
14 Consider, e.g.,  with ε−= XXuV ))(( 0>ε . This implies   and 
 with , which is negative if 
0)1()()"( 2 >+= −−εεε XXuV
εXXuVXRT == ))((/1)( 2)1()('' −−= εεε XXRT 1<ε , but positive if 
1>ε . 
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Proposition 1. Assume a unique interior X*. Then 
 
0* >ZX  for Z = , , p, 15|)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π *)(' XRT ,     
  for Z = 0* <ZX SR , , , m.                (11) *)(XRT )ˆ(' 0SU ΠΠ
 
Here , i.e. Pratt’s measure of absolute risk aversion. Its 
positive effect on X* can be seen from dividing both sides of eq. (10) by . While 
 is a determinant of risk premia in terms of money,  is a determinant of 
the utility loss due to risk, and can therefore be considered as a measure of absolute risk 
aversion in terms of utility. Thus, X* depends positively on , , product 
price p, marginal efficiency  of X at X* in raising , and negatively on 
perceived reliability of the stereotypic information R
)ˆ('/|)ˆ(''|)ˆ( 000
SSS UUr ΠΠΠ ΠΠ≡
)ˆ(' S0U ΠΠ
)ˆ( S0r Π |)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ
|)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ )ˆ( S0r Π
*)(' XRT )(XRT
S, , marginal utility of profit 
, and number of screened candidates m. The next subsection will show how R
*)(XRT
)ˆ(' S0U ΠΠ S can 
vary as a result of a change in ingroup identification I*. By virtue of ineq. (11) this will then 
also affect X*. 
 
C. Identification and stereotyping 
An interesting finding in social psychology that we want to incorporate into the model is that 
when someone experiences self-relevant uncertainty in the terminology of (one interpretation 
of) social-identity theory (e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998), he is inclined to identify himself with a 
salient ingroup (e.g. men). Experiencing self-relevant uncertainty (SRUC) means that 
someone feels uncertain about things that are important in his life and for his self-definition, 
such as having a job or being able to make a living. This situation is aversive, and therefore 
people in some situations react by creating a kind of “certainty illusion” by identifying 
themselves with their ingroup, i.e., they depersonalize themselves and perceive themselves 
more as group members and less as individuals. Turner (1984, p. 528) describes the process 
and effect of depersonalization as follows: a “cognitive redefinition of the self – from unique 
attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated 
stereotypes”. A certainty illusion exists in such a situation because group membership 
provides individuals with perceptions of right and wrong and standards of behaviour etc. This 
illusion diminishes their SRUC and, at the same time, induces them to rely more on 
stereotypes and prejudice in their decisions, because they now act as “group members” and 
not as “individuals”. 
                                                 
15 This refers to the partial derivative of X* with respect to changes in  at given (old) X*. *)(' XRT
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 How do these social-psychological processes fit into our model? The basic problem is 
a suitable interpretation of the concept of SRUC in the context of the model. Let us start with 
some observations. First, SRUC is a perception accompanied by a negative emotion. Second, 
SRUC can increase in two ways: (i) the subjective uncertainty (UC) about important things 
may increase, (ii) the self-relevancy (SR), i.e. subjective importance, of the things one is 
uncertain about increases. This observation suggests to operationalize the concept of SRUC as 
a product of self-relevancy SR and uncertainty UC. Moreover, we can interpret the SR as the 
subjective importance of UC for the (overall) subjective well-being of a person. Multiplying 
this SR with UC then yields the perceived loss or gain in well-being due to the uncertainty, 
where the loss holds for risk-averse persons and the gain for risk-loving persons.16 In the 
context of our model, the UC is given by the perceived-risk indicator  (or 
), and the corresponding SRUC is the ensuing ex ante expected utility loss 
 as given by the last term of utility function (8).
)|( TqqV
)|( TqV Π
)( UE a ∆ 17 This UC can be considered as self-
relevant since it implies, for sufficiently low levels of profits, a substantial risk of negative 
profits, and hence bankruptcy. Accordingly, for higher level of profits the SR would be low. 
The expression for  in eq. (8) implies that the SR of  is equal to )( UE a ∆ )|( TqqV
2
02
1 |)ˆ(''| pU SΠΠ , and so proportional to absolute risk aversion  and product 
price squared  (see Sec. III.A for more on this).  
|)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ
2p
 The previous section has shown that one way in which the employer can reduce 
, and hence his SRUC, is raising his screening expenditure X. However, this is 
costly, and in the given social context an alternative, possibly less costly means to reduce 
SRUC is raising one’s identification with the ingroup I. The resulting stronger “certainty 
illusion” can be interpreted as leading to a higher perceived reliability R
)|( TqqV
S of the stereotypic 
information, and hence by virtue of eq. (9) to a lower perceived risk , and so a lower 
SRUC. The stronger identification I can raise R
)|( TqqV
S in two ways: (i) by a stronger focus on 
                                                 
16 Strictly speaking, the psychological concept of SRUC only applies to risk-averse persons since it 
involves a negative emotion. However, by allowing the emotion to be positive it can be extended to 
risk-loving persons as well.   
17 The approximations in the previous sections imply that we neglect terms in  (see 
footnote 12), although this variance is reduced by increases in I (see below). However, since this ex 
ante uncertainty in the posterior estimates  is resolved when the test estimates  have been made, 
it does not really seem self-relevant and aversive, and hence will not induce the employer to create a 
certainty illusion by stronger identification with his ingroup. However, uncertainties in other variables 
that are here neglected as well will contribute to the employer’s SRUC about his profit, and are 
therefore considered in Sec. IIIC. 
)()ˆ( qVqV =
iqˆ
T
iq
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stereotypes (see above) it leads to a higher perceived reliability of the stereotypic perceptions 
Sq  as indicators of average productivity q  for ingroup as well as outgroup members (see the 
decomposition of RS in Sec. C), and (ii) it raises the perceived reliability of q  as an indicator 
of individual productivity  for ingroup as well as outgroup members (so both the ingroup 
and outgroup are perceived as more homogeneous with respect to marginal team 
productivity).
iq
18 Thus, a higher I can reduce both the perceived first-order risk  and the 
perceived second-order risk . 
)(vV
)(wV
 Just as in the case of screening expenditure X, we ask how the level of ingroup 
identification I is determined. To answer this question, we assume, in line with social-identity 
theory, that people have a personal identity and one or more ingroup identities. In some 
situations the personal identity, in others a specific ingroup identity is more salient. 
Accordingly, we define I more precisely as the degree to which a specific ingroup identity is 
salient as compared to the personal identity.19 Hence, I is (analogously to S) continuously 
variable between 0 (zero weight of ingroup identity) and 1 (100% weight of ingroup identity 
and zero weight of personal identity). Moreover, we assume that it is not generally optimal in 
terms of individual well-being to identify fully with an ingroup at the expense of a zero 
weight of personal identity (I = 1). It seems more plausible to suppose that for a certain I* 
between 0 and 1 there is an optimal balance between ingroup identity with weight I* and 
personal identity with weight 1-I*. Important determinants of this optimal balance are the 
needs for reduction of self-relevant uncertainty and enhancement of self-esteem and 
distinctiveness, which are seen as additional motives for identification with an ingroup in 
social psychology (Hewstone, 2002; Mullin & Hogg, 1998). In particular, the SRUC due to 
 is reduced as I rises. In addition, SRUC due to other, profit and not-profit-related 
uncertainties is diminished as well by increasing I. On the other hand, there are marginal costs 
from “depersonalization”, i.e., less personal identity, for which a psychological need exists as 
well. This leads to a balance of marginal benefits and costs of I, which is interrelated with the 
equality of marginal benefits and costs of screening expenditure X. This is modeled as the 
maximization of the employer’s utility function (5) with respect to I and X. Again using 
)|( TqqV
                                                 
18 See, for example, De Cremer (2001), who gives an overview of the social-psychological literature 
on ingroup and outgroup-homogeneity effects. 
19 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one ingroup with which team members 
identify. This is a reasonable assumption at a certain point in time, in a certain setting, where one 
particular categorization is salient. 
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Taylor expansion (8), omitting the constant  and rearranging terms, maximand 
 is then given by 
)ˆ( 0
SU ΠΠ
),( IXU
  ( ) mXUXRIRpUIUIXU STSSI )ˆ('))()(()ˆ('')(, 012021 ΠΠ ΠΠ −++≅ − . (12)  
Here  represents the utility of all benefits and costs of I apart from the benefit of 
reduction of SRUC due to . It is strictly concave (so ) with positive 
marginal utility for 
)(IU I
)|( TqqV 0IU I <)(''
0II < , a satiation point at 0II = , and negative marginal utility for . 
Thus, if there were no uncertainty , the employer would reach a psychological 
equilibrium at , at which his utility  is maximal with respect to I. However, the 
employer also likes to reduce his SRUC due to , which is indicated by the ex ante 
expected utility loss term in eq. (12) next to . By raising I beyond its “base level” 
each team member can increase , and hence lower the utility loss. The utility loss can 
also be reduced by increasing screening expenditures X, and hence , but this has costs 
that are indicated by the last term in eq. (12).    
0II >
)|( TqqV
0I )(IU
I
)|( TqqV
)(IU I 0I  
)(IR S
)(XRT
 The first-order condition for maximization of utility function (12) with respect to I at 
given X can be written as 
  , (13)  *)('*)('))(*)((|)ˆ(''| 220
1
2 IUIRXRIRpU
ISTSS −=+ −ΠΠ
where the left-hand side represents the marginal benefit  of I at I* and the right-hand side 
the marginal cost  at I* of raising I above its “base level” . Since ,  is 
rising as a function of . The second-order condition for an interior I*, conditional on X, 
then implies that  must be falling or rising less than  as a function of I at I*. Making a 
second-order Taylor approximation , this second-order 
condition is easily shown to be always fulfilled (see App. A). Plausibly assuming that there is 
a unique interior I*, we then obtain, analogously to Proposition 1:     
IB
IC 0I 0IU
I <)('' IC
0II >
IB IC
2
00
I
0
II IIIUIUIU ))(('')()( −+≅
 
Proposition 2. Assume a unique interior I*, conditional on X. Then 
 
0* >ZI  for Z = , , p, , |)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π *)(' IRS
0* <ZI  for Z = , , .      (14) *)(IRS )(XRT |*)('| IU I
 
The partial derivative with respect to  now holds at constant marginal cost 
 of I* in terms of money. 
)ˆ( S0r Π
)ˆ('/|*)('| 0
SI UIU ΠΠ
 To derive the simultaneous interior X* and I* we should combine eqs. (10) and (13). 
The expressions for  and  on the left-hand sides of these equations are similar: in fact 
, where  is the marginal benefit of raising either 
XB IB
R
S
I
T
X BIRBXRB == )('/)('/ RB SR  or TR  
by one unit. Using this symmetry, Appendix A proves: 
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Proposition 3. Assume a unique interior equilibrium (X*,I*). Then 
 
  for Z = , , p, , ,     0* >ZX |)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π *)(' XRT |*)('| IU I
  for Z = , , , m, ,             (15a) 0* <ZX *)(IRS *)(XRT )ˆ(' 0SU ΠΠ *)(' IRS
 
0* <>ZI  for Z = , , p, and |)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π 0* ><ZI  for Z = ,  if and 
only if 
*)(IRS *)(XRT
0XRT ><*)('' , 
0* >ZI  for Z = , , and  for Z = , .    (15b) *)(' IRS )ˆ(' 0SU ΠΠ 0* <ZI |*)('| IU I *)(' XRT
 
Inequalities (15b) indicate that  is positive for Z = , , p if 
, zero if , and negative if , and analogous relations 
for the other partial derivatives on the first line of (15b). Thus, if absolute risk aversion as 
measured by  or  rises, ceteris paribus, self-relevant uncertainty SRUC 
as given by minus the second term of utility function (12) and the expected marginal benefits 
 and  (eqs. (10) and (13)) rise as well. This leads to an increase in X* conditional on I 
(Prop. 1) as well as simultaneous with I* (Prop. 3), and to an increase in I* conditional on X 
(Prop. 2), which is consistent with the findings in social psychology (e.g., Mullin and Hogg, 
1998). However, it only leads to an increase in I* simultaneous with X* if  i.e. 
if the marginal efficiency  of X in raising  falls with increasing X at X*. If 
, I* even decreases as risk aversion rises. This is due to the accommodating rise 
in screening expenditure X*, raising the perceived reliability of individual information 
*
ZI |)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π
0XRT <*)('' 0XRT =*)('' 0XRT >*)(''
|)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ )ˆ( S0r Π
XB IB
0XRT <*)('' ,
)(' XRT )(XRT
0XRT >*)(''
*TR , 
and hence lowering the perceived posterior uncertainty  of the q)|( TqqV i of a new team 
member (eq. (9)). This lowers  (eq. (13)), and hence leads to a lower I*. Since the  
curve is horizontal by approximation, the rise in X* is considerable, and will, when its 
marginal efficiency  rises as well (raising ), even be so strong as to push I* back 
below its original level. Thus, the rise in X* more than fully substitutes for the initial rise in I* 
in reducing SRUC. This possibility of full substitution of X for I, but not the reverse, is due to 
our approximation of a constant . However, this is a plausible approximation (see the 
previous section), and in combination with the case where , it may be considered 
as a ‘worst-case’ scenario with respect to the effect of rising risk aversion on I*. This will 
serve to strengthen the robustness of our result of a positive effect of increasing competition 
on I* in Sec. III. 
IB XC
*)(' XRT *XB
XC
0*)('' ≥XRT
 The interpretation of the other inequalities in Proposition 3 is straightforward. In 
comparison to the conditional effects in Propositions 1 and 2, there are now also positive 
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cross-substitution effects  and  of rises in the marginal 
costs of I* and X* on each other’s level, and negative cross-effects  and 
 of rises in the marginal efficiencies of I* and X* on each other’s level. 
|)ˆ('|/* 0
SIUX Π∂∂ )ˆ('/* S0UI ΠΠ∂∂
*)('/* IRX S∂∂
*)('/* XRI T∂∂
 What are the consequences of all this for the equilibrium value S* of the extent of 
using stereotypic perceptions? According to eq. (4) . Hence, the 
equilibrium value S* is, via 
)/(* *** TSS RRRS +=
*SR  and *TR , determined by the simultaneous equilibrium values 
I* and X*. A rise in X* raises *TR , and hence lowers S*, whereas a rise in I* raises *SR , and 
hence raises S*. So, when in the case where  risk aversion  (or 
) rises, leading to a rise in X* and a fall in I* (Prop. 3), S* unambiguously falls. On the 
other hand, when  holds and risk aversion rises, the resulting rises in X* and I* 
counteract each other in their effects on S*, making the sign of the net effect on S* 
ambiguous. Rewriting eq. (4) as , it follows that S* rises/falls if the 
relative (i.e. percentual) rise in 
0*)('' ≥XRT |)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ
)ˆ( S0r Π
0XRT <*)(''
1** )/1(* −+= ST RRS
*SR  is higher/lower than the relative rise in *TR . Using this 
property, Appendix A derives: 
 
Proposition 4. Assume a unique interior equilibrium (X*,I*). Then 
 
0* <>ZS  for Z = , , p, and |)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ )ˆ( 0Sr Π 0* ><ZS  for Z = , , if and 
only if 
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0* <ZS  for Z = , , and  for Z = , .   (16) *)(' XRT |
                                                
*)('| IU I 0* >ZS *)(' IRS )ˆ(' 0SU ΠΠ
 
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality for  is negative. Thus, only when 
 is more negative than this expression
*)('' XRT
*)('' XRT 20, a rise in risk aversion leads to a sufficiently 
weak increase in X* and a sufficiently strong increase in I* so as to cause a rise in 
stereotyping S*. The interpretation of the other inequalities in Proposition 4 is 
straightforward.  The inequalities have interesting implications for the effects of competition 
on discrimination, which will be examined in Section III. 
 
D. Rationalization of discriminatory taste and group discrimination  
 
20 If    with ε−= XXuV ))(( 0>ε  (see footnote 13), it can be shown that ε , i.e. the absolute 
magnitude of the elasticity of  with respect to X, should then be smaller than ½ if the absolute 
magnitude of the elasticity of  with respect to I is not too much greater than 1. 
)(uV
)(uV
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As we saw in Section A, a rise in stereotyping S* leads to a proportional increase in individual 
statistical discrimination, but it can only imply an increase in group discrimination if at least 
one of the stereotypic perceptions SIq  and SOq  of the average marginal productivities in the 
ingroup and outgroup is incorrect. In the economic literature on discrimination (see, e.g., 
Aigner and Cain, p. 177) it has been argued that such incorrect perceptions are unlikely to 
persist in competitive markets since they lead to a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
competitors with correct or less incorrect perceptions. Hence, either the incorrect perceptions 
will be corrected by learning about real productivities or employers with such perceptions 
will, in the long run, be competed away. However, the psychological literature on 
discrimination shows that even when real differences in q  between two groups have 
disappeared, incorrect stereotypic perceptions of such differences tend to be quite persistent 
and widespread due to several psychological processes. 
First, this stereotypic perception may be deeply ingrained in the mind of employers as 
a result of socialization and influencing by the media. Imagine, for example, the standard 
picture of the role of women versus men in the media. Relatedly, the stereotypic perception 
may serve as justification and rationalization of an emotional prejudice and the ensuing 
discriminatory behavior against the outgroup (e.g., Snyder and Miene, 1994). This can be 
explained from the psychological inclination of a person to reduce cognitive dissonance 
between, on the one hand, his self-image (as someone who does not discriminate without a 
good reason) and, on the other hand, his discriminatory prejudice and behavior (Festinger, 
1957; Arrow, 1973, p. 26). As these processes largely work unconsciously, the resulting 
emotions and cognitions will not easily change. Quite a different kind of reason for the 
persistence of wrong stereotypic perceptions is implied by the social-psychological BIAS 
model of Fiedler (1996). This model explains many so-called “biases” in differential 
perception of in and outgroups from the fact that ingroup samples are usually bigger than 
outgroup samples (e.g. the sample a male CEO makes of male versus female CEOs, but also 
the sample an economist makes of fellow economists versus social psychologists). Even when 
there are no real differences in distribution of the productivities qi between the ingroup and 
the outgroup, the ingroup is then perceived as having a higher q  than the outgroup since the 
pattern of productivity-relevant attributes of the bigger ingroup sample correlates more 
strongly with the ideal pattern than the pattern of productivity-relevant attributes of the 
smaller outgroup sample does.21 This represents boundedly rational information processing by 
                                                 
21 It would lead too far to explain the model in detail here, but see Fiedler (1996, 2000). See Fryer and 
Jackson (2003) for a somewhat related approach in the context of economics. 
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agents who do not know how to make correct inferences from real-world samples about the 
underlying populations, and is a persistent phenomenon of human cognition.     
 Let us therefore consider such a case of incorrect stereotypic perceptions in more 
detail. We assume that employers have incorrect perceptions of a too low OSO qq <  of 
outgroup members, but correct perceptions ISI qq =  of ingroup members. Since in many 
real-life situations cognitive stereotypes and emotional prejudices go together (Kinder & 
Sears, 1981), we further presume that the incorrect perceptions SOq  are partially due to 
rationalization of prejudices and the ensuing discriminatory tastes of the employers against 
the outgroup. However, the associated discrimination coefficients  of the employers 
(Becker, 1957) are supposed to be fully rationalized into the (generally heterogeneous) 
Od
SOq , 
leaving no separate contribution of  to the group discrimination in addition to that of Od SOq . 
The incorrect SOq  lead to stereotypic overestimations SOSIS qqq −≡∆  of the real difference 
in average productivity OI qqq −≡∆  between the ingroup and the outgroup, and hence to 
group discrimination against the outgroup in favour of the ingroup. This group discrimination 
can be measured by the discrimination coefficients of the employers, i.e by the objective 
expectations of the amounts of money the employers are willing to pay on average for hiring 
an ingroup instead of an outgroup member in addition to what is implied by the real 
productivity difference q∆ . These discrimination coefficients are fully based on productivity 
estimates. We normalize them by product price p since what matters most are the 
discrimination coefficients relative to the part qp∆  of the wage difference  
between the ingroup and the outgroup that is due to the real 
OI www −≡∆
q∆ . If 0=q∆ , the discrimination 
coefficient relative to  is relevant, where  positively depends on p, and is even 
proportional to p when the labor supply of ingroup members is inelastic. The common factor 
in both cases is p, and hence discrimination coefficient D is defined as 
Iw Iw
 qqqEpqqpqpED jljl
o
jljl
o ∆∆∆∆∆∆ −=−≡ )|ˆ(/}){|ˆ( ,           (17)  
where jlqˆ∆  is the average of ljjl qqq ˆˆˆ −≡∆  over all possible candidates j from the ingroup 
and l from the outgroup. Taking the first difference of eq. (3), it is easily seen that 
  )( qqSD S ∆∆ −= .         (18) 
 In this expression not only the extent of using stereotypic perceptions S, but also the 
size of the stereotypic overestimation qq S ∆∆ −  should be considered as endogenous since 
social-psychological research (e.g, Lepore & Brown, 1999) suggests that not only S, but also 
prejudice, and hence via rationalization qq S ∆∆ − , increases with ingroup identification I. To 
find an expression for qq S ∆∆ − , we first suppose OS0S dqqq γ∆∆∆ +=− , where S0q∆  is 
the part of qq S ∆∆ −  due to cognitive biases in the interpretation of information (see above) 
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and  is the rationalization part with positive parameterOdγ γ .22 Next, note that the prejudice 
gives rise to a disutility  of having O outgroup members in the team (assumed to be 
separable from utility function (5) “before rationalization”; cf. Arrow, 1973, p. 6). This 
implies a disutility  of hiring an outgroup member (assumed to be diminishing in O), 
translating into the discrimination coefficient , which is the amount of profit an employer 
is willing to sacrifice to avoid the disutility . Hence, the disutility of , in linear 
approximation given by , equals , and so .
)(OU O
)(' OU O
Od
)(' OU O Od
OS dU )ˆ(' 0ΠΠ )(' OU O )ˆ('/)(' 0SOO UOUd ΠΠ= 23
Furthermore, we assume that disutility  due to prejudice increases with 
ingroup identification I as , where  and  for I higher 
than a critical threshold value , 
)(' OU O
)()()(' OgIfOU O = 0)( >If 0)(' >If
0≥cI 0)( =If  for cII ≤ , , and .0Og >)( 0Og <)(' 24 The 
underlying presumption is that only when I exceeds a certain minimum level , a 
discriminatory taste will develop, and then grow with I. Both  and the level of  may 
vary among employers (see also Sec. III.B). Substituting the expression for  into that 
for  and the resulting expression into 
cI
cI )(Og
)(' OU O
Od OS0
S dqqq γ∆∆∆ +=−  yields 
)ˆ('/)()( 00
SSS UOgIfqqq Πγ∆∆∆ Π+=− .      (19) 
Thus, a higher equilibrium value I* of ingroup identification implies not only a higher S*, but, 
for , also a larger cII >* qq S ∆∆ −* , and hence a higher team discrimination coefficient D* 
via qq S ∆∆ −*  as well as S* by virtue of eq. (18).  
                                                 
22 Eq. (18) then corresponds to the taste for discrimination as conceived by Becker (1971, pp. 16-17) 
when he says that it incorporates both prejudice and ignorance about the true economic efficiency of 
the discriminated group. However, a difference is that whereas Becker states that ignorance that is not 
based on prejudice may be quickly eliminated by the spread of knowledge, we assume, in line with 
social-psychological insights of Fiedler (1996), that such ignorance can persist due to systematic 
cognitive mistakes in the interpretation of information. 
23 This is the negative of the marginal rate of substitution of profit for outgroup members (cf. Arrow, 
1973, p. 7). 
24 An important component of this ‘discriminatory taste’ could be the disutility of a loss in ingroup 
identity of an ingroup member when he has to work with an outgroup member (see Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000, p. 732). It is plausible that this component increases when the identification with the 
ingroup I rises. In the case where the ingroup consists of men and the outgroup of women, a related 
component of the discriminatory taste may be the disutility due to violation of the social norm that 
when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (as measured in Eurobarometer 
surveys, see Azmat et al., 2003, p. 22; see also Vendrik, 2003). 
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III. Effects of competition 
A. Effects on I* and X* 
What happens with ingroup identification I* and screening expenditure X* when competition 
on the supply side of the product market intensifies? Such an increase in competition is 
conceived as a rise in upward-sloping supply relative to downward-sloping demand in the 
product market near the equilibrium price p. This may be due to either an increase in the 
number of competing teams or a fall in demand. As a result, p, and hence expected profit  
(at given I and O 
S
0Πˆ
25) will fall. This has several effects.  
At given variance in profits , the fall in  will raise the risk of negative 
profits, i.e. of going bankrupt, for the employers. Intuition suggests that this will raise the self-
relevant uncertainty SRUC of employers. According to our interpretation in Section II.C of 
SRUC as the ex ante expected utility loss  due to the uncertainty  in 
the q
)|( TqV Π S0Πˆ
)( UE a ∆ )|( TqqVUC =
i of a new team member, self-relevancy 2021 |)ˆ(''| pUSR
SΠΠ=  should then increase. For 
many specifications of utility function  absolute risk aversion measure  
rises when  falls, but not for all (e.g. for the additive quadratic specification  
remains constant). Moreover, the fall in product price p suppresses SR via the factor p
)(ΠΠU |)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ
S
0Πˆ |)ˆ(''| 0SU ΠΠ
2. This 
effect appears since the fall in p directly lowers the uncertainty  in 
revenue from a new team member, i.e. less is at stake in absolute money terms. For the 
intuitively expected net rise in SR, and hence in SRUC, to occur, the relative (i.e. in terms of 
percentage) rise in risk aversion  should be greater than the relative fall in p
)|()|( T2Tii qqVpqpqV =
|)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ 2. To 
see when this may hold, we approximate utility function  by the common power 
function 
)(ΠΠU
 ,  ρΠΠ ρΠ /)( =U 01 ≠< ρρ , ,  
,ln)( ΠΠΠ =U   0=ρ .           (20) 
This implies . Empirical evidence is generally consistent with 
values of ρ in the range of -3 to -1 (Nicholson, 1998, p. 226), and since the relative fall in  
is greater than the relative fall in p, it easily follows that for 
ρΠ ΠρΠ +−−= 200 ˆ)1(|)ˆ(''| SSU
S
0Πˆ
0≤ρ  the relative rise in 
 is greater than the relative fall in p|)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ 2 (see App. B for the derivation). Thus, if 
employers are not much less risk averse than generally measured, 2021 |)ˆ(''| pUSR
SΠΠ= , 
and hence SRUC, rises as competition increases. By the same token, the expected marginal 
benefits  and  of X and I in reducing SRUC, as given by the left-hand sides of eqs. (10) 
and (13), will rise as well. This arouses incentives to spend more resources on screening of 
candidate team members as well as to identify more strongly with the ingroup. 
XB IB
                                                 
25 Note that X=0 in . S0Πˆ
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However, Proposition 3 implies that these incentives are only sufficient to lead to a 
rise in the equilibrium I* simultaneous with X* when . On the other hand, 
another determinant of I* changes as well, viz. the marginal utility of profit . This 
rises as competition increases, and hence profits drop. Consequently,  as given by the 
right-hand side of eq. (10) rises. This means that employers expect a higher opportunity cost 
of their screening expenditures when their expected profits are lower since the expenditures 
will then weigh more heavily on their budgets. (This implies an income effect of lower profits 
on X*.) As a result, the equilibrium X*, conditional on I, will only increase if  rises more 
than . This holds if and only if  rises as 
competition increases. Intuition suggests that absolute risk aversion measure  will rise 
as profits fall, but again this holds only for certain specifications of  like power 
function (20) (Nicholson, 1998, pp. 224-225). For this function , 
implying that the relative rise in  is even greater than the relative fall in p, but not 
necessarily greater than the relative fall in p
0*)('' <XRT
)ˆ(' 0
SU ΠΠ
XC
*XB
*XC
2
00
2
0 )ˆ()ˆ('/|)ˆ(''| prUpU
SSS ΠΠΠ ΠΠ ≡
)ˆ( 0
Sr Π
)(ΠΠU
1
00
ˆ)1()ˆ( −−= SSr ΠρΠ
)ˆ( 0
Sr Π
2. Appendix B shows that for  greater than 
total production costs C the relative rise in  is actually smaller than the relative fall in 
p
S
0Πˆ
)ˆ( 0
Sr Π
2, whereas for lower  the reverse holds. Hence, for   rises more than , 
resulting in falling conditional screening expenditure X* as competition increases. On the 
other hand, as  has fallen below C,  starts to rise more than , resulting in rising 
X* as competition increases.  
S
0Πˆ CS0 >Πˆ *XC *XB
S
0Πˆ *XB *XC
In contrast to , the expected marginal cost  of ingroup identification, which is 
given by the right-hand side of eq. (13), does not change as competition increases since it is 
non-monetary. This implies that the equilibrium I*, conditional on X, unambiguously rises as 
competition increases. Moreover, it can be shown that I*, simultaneous with X*, 
unambiguously rises as well if and only if  is smaller than a positive expression 
which varies with  in a very complex way. Because of this complexity we do not specify 
it here.
XC IC
*)('' XRT
S
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26 This result is due to the rise in , which leads to substitution of screening 
expenditure X by ingroup identification I in reducing self-relevant uncertainty SRUC. This 
substitution works as follows: the fall or less strong rise in X* due to the rise in  lowers 
the reliability of individual information R
*XC
*XC
T*, which raises uncertainty  (eq. (9)). This 
raises  (eq. (13)), and hence leads to a higher I*. In its turn, this raises R
)|( TqqV
*IB
S*, which lowers 
, and hence , leading to a lower X*, etc., until X* and I* stabilize on a new 
simultaneous equilibrium.  
)|( TqqV *XB
                                                 
26 An extensive derivation is available from the authors on request. 
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The negative feedback of a rising I* on X* adds to the direct negative effect of a 
higher , and both effects counteract the positive effect of a higher  due to the higher 
risk aversion . To derive which effects may be stronger under which conditions 
and since a general derivation is untractable, we now make linear approximations 
 and , implying  and , and 
 and  with elasticities -1, which represent intermediate cases 
(see Prop. 3 and footnote 14). Appendix B shows that then, in the case of power function (20) 
with 
*XC *XB
|)ˆ(''| 0
SU ΠΠ
XXRT α=)( IIR S β=)( 0*)('' =XRT 0*)('' =IR S
11 XuV −−= α)( 11IqV −−= β)(
21 /<ρ , the negative feedback effect of a higher initial I* dominates for sufficiently 
low , implying falling X* simultaneous with I*, when competition increases.S0Πˆ 27 For 
 the negative effect of a higher  dominates (see above), and there may be an 
intermediate range of  where the positive effect of a higher  dominates, 
implying rising simultaneous X* as competition intensifies. However, the latter effect is not 
strong enough to prevent I* from rising (cf. Prop. 3). Since a lower value of  can be 
shown to imply a stronger rise in I*, and hence in R
CS0 >Πˆ *XC
CS0 <Πˆ *XB
*)('' XRT
S*, as competition increases26, we then 
have a stronger negative feedback on X*. Hence, the above result of a predominantly falling 
X* as competition increases a fortiori holds when .   0*)('' <XRT
 
B. Effects on S*, qq S ∆∆ −* , and D* 
The rise in the simultaneous I* leads to an increase in RS*, and hence in the extent of 
stereotyping . This rise in S* is reinforced when the simultaneous X* 
falls, lowering R
)/(* *** TSS RRRS +=
T*. On the other hand, when X* rises as competition increases, the direction of 
change in S* is ambiguous. Accordingly, in the case of power function (20) with 2/1<ρ  and 
the linear approximations made above, there may be an intermediate range of  for 
which S* falls as competition increases, while for all other levels of  S* rises (until it 
reaches value 1 for very low 
CS0 <Πˆ
S
0Πˆ
S
0
S
0 ΠΠ (≤ˆ  28; see App. B for this and following results). Since a 
lower value of  implies a stronger rise in R*)('' XRT S*, but does not affect X*, and hence RT*, 
                                                 
27 At an assumedly very low level S0Π(  of , X* becomes zero, and remains zero when  further 
falls. This is due to the particular implication of power function (20) that the marginal utility of profit 
 goes to infinity when  approaches zero. Since this implication seems too extreme, 
power function (20) may not be a good approximation of  for very low levels of . 
S
0Πˆ S0Πˆ
)ˆ(' 0
SU ΠΠ S0Πˆ
)ˆ( 0
SU ΠΠ S0Πˆ
28 This occurs when X*, and hence , becomes zero (eq. (4)). Estimates of the individual 
productivities of candidate team members are then purely based on stereotypic perceptions (eq. (1)). 
Since this case of zero screening expenditure, and hence, e.g., no job interviews, seems rather 
unrealistic (see also the previous footnote), we will pay little attention to it in the following. 
** XRT α=
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as competition increases26, this result of a predominantly rising S* a fortiori holds when 
.  0*)('' <XRT
The rise in the simultaneous I* for “not too positive ” (see above) also leads 
to a rise in the stereotypic overestimation 
*)('' XRT
qq S ∆∆ −*  of the average-productivity difference 
between the ingroup and outgroup for  (eq. (19)). On the other hand, the rise in the 
marginal utility of profit  directly lowers 
cII >*
)ˆ(' S0U ΠΠ qq S ∆∆ −*  via the “discriminatory taste 
coefficient” . This represents an income effect of falling profits (Comanor, 1973), 
according to which falling profits make it relatively more expensive to indulge one’s 
discriminatory taste, and hence suppress the amount of money one is willing to spend on it. 
As a result, employers will be more cautious in their stereotypic perceptions. App. B shows 
that, for the linear approximations made above and approximating  for  linearly as 
 in eq. (19), this negative income effect on 
*Od
)(If cII >
cII − qq S ∆∆ −*  dominates the positive effect of 
stronger ingroup identification if 0c II < , but is dominated by it if . 0c II >
Thus, for employers with 0c II <  qq S ∆∆ −*  falls as competition strengthens, for 
S
0
S
0 ΠΠ (>ˆ  (see above).29 This counteracts rises in  in the discrimination coefficient *S
)(** * qqSD S ∆∆ −= . However, for the case of power function (20) with 21 /<ρ , the 
positive effect on D* of a rising  can still be shown to dominate the negative effects on D* 
for sufficiently low  
*S
S
0Πˆ 30, whereas for sufficiently high  the negative income effect 
dominates. Furthermore, there may be an intermediate range of  (including ) 
where D* first rises as competition increases and then falls (due to a rising X*). Thus, for 
, D* as a function of  has, for 
S
0Πˆ
S
0Πˆ CS =0Πˆ
0c II < S0Πˆ S0S0 ΠΠ (≥ˆ , a U-shape with a possible “hump” in 
the middle part.31 For employers with  the rise in 0c II > qq S ∆∆ −*  reinforces the positive 
effect on D* of a rising  such that D* rises as well as competition increases with possibly 
an intermediate range of  where D* falls, but now with a lower “probability”. Note that 
for  (which can only occur for sufficiently low  when ), 
*S
S
0Πˆ
cII ≤* S0Πˆ 0c II >
00
* >=− SS qqq ∆∆∆  implies proportionality of D* to S*. A negative instead of zero value of 
 reinforces rises in D* via S* and *)('' XRT qq S ∆∆ −*  as competition increases, but for 
 it is not clear whether it may eliminate the U-shape of D* as a function of  for 
sufficiently negative . 
0c II < S0Πˆ
*)('' XRT
                                                 
29 For S0
S
0 ΠΠ (≤ˆ  qq S ∆∆ −*  can be shown to “probably” rise as competition increases. 
30 These  are assumed to be still higher than S0Πˆ S0Π(  (see footnotes 27 and 28). 
31 For S0
S
0 ΠΠ (<ˆ  (and so ) D* “probably” rises as competition increases due to the rise in 1*=S
qq S ∆∆ −*  (see footnote 29). 
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The effects of competition that have been identified in this section can be summarized 
as 
 
Proposition 5. Consider power function (20). When competition on the supply side of the 
product market increases, 
a. if 0≤ρ , self-relevant uncertainty SRUC initially rises;  
b. if and only if 0≤ρ  and  is “not too positive”, simultaneous ingroup 
identification I*  rises; 
*)('' XRT
c. if 21 /<ρ ,  and , simultaneous screening expenditure X* 
falls except for a possible intermediate range of , where X* rises, and except 
for assumedly very small 
0XRT ≤*)('' 0*)('' =IR S
CS0 <Πˆ
S
0
S
0 ΠΠ (≤ˆ , where 0X =* ;   
d. if 21 /<ρ ,  and , stereotype use S* rises except for a 
possible intermediate range of , where S* falls, and except for very small 
0XRT ≤*)('' 0*)('' =IR S
CS0 <Πˆ
S
0
S
0 ΠΠ (≤ˆ , where ; 1S =*
e. if , , and 0XRT =*)('' 0*)('' =IR S cIIIf −=)(  for , stereotypic 
overestimation 
cII >
qq S ∆∆ −*   falls for S0S0 ΠΠ (>ˆ  when 0c II < , and rises for 
S
0
S
0 ΠΠ (>ˆ  such that  when ; cII >* 0c II >
f. if 21 /<ρ , , , and 0XRT =*)('' 0*)('' =IR S cIIIf −=)(  for , discrimination 
coefficient D*, when , falls for sufficiently high  and rises for sufficiently 
low 
cII >
0c II < S0Πˆ
SS
00
ˆ ΠΠ (≥  except for a possible intermediate range of  (including C), where 
D* first rises and then falls; when , D* rises except for a possible intermediate 
range of , where D* falls.  
S
0Πˆ
0c II >
S
0Πˆ
 
The results under (d)-(f) are particularly interesting in relation to the long-run selection 
mechanism in Becker’s theory of employer discrimination. According to this mechanism 
employers with lower D* drive employers with higher D* out of the product market as  
approaches zero. In particular, if some employers have zero D*, these are the only teams to 
survive in the market, thus eliminating discrimination. However, our psychological model 
casts doubts on the assumption that some employers have zero D*. It is a very general human 
inclination to identify with one’s ingroup, and in many cases stronger identification with 
one’s ingroup will raise the probability of developing a preference for the ingroup or a 
discriminatory taste against the outgroup. Even employers who initially (say at ) have a 
zero discriminatory taste ( ) may develop a non-zero one ( ) under competitive 
pressure as this makes them identify more strongly with their ingroup. In our model their I* 
then passes their (person-specific) critical threshold value . Further, to justify their 
S
0Πˆ
0II =
0d O =* 0d O >*
0c II >
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discriminatory taste, they can rationalize it into a stereotypic overestimation qq S ∆∆ −*  of the 
average-productivity difference between the ingroup and outgroup. The discrimination 
coefficients D* would then rise above zero (if they are not already positive due to the 
cognitive bias S0q∆ ) and further rise as  falls, by increasing use S* of S0Πˆ *Sq∆  as well as 
rising qq S ∆∆ −*  (see Prop. 5.d-f). In the end, even the discrimination coefficient of the 
surviving teams with the lowest D* in the market would still be substantially positive.32
 Thus, our psychological model offers arguments why increasing competitive pressure 
may not diminish and may even raise employer discrimination. This points to the importance 
of policy measures like affirmative action to alleviate this problem. Holzer and Neumark 
(2000) provide evidence for the U.S.A. that affirmative action has increased the number of 
recruitment and screening practices used by employers and has raised employers’ willingness 
to hire stigmatized applicants. In the context of our model, the former increase can be 
interpreted as a rise in screening expenditure X* (cf. Antonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3190) as a 
result of an additional marginal benefit of X*. This extra benefit can be subtracted from 
marginal cost  as given by the right-hand side of eq. (10)), and so has the effect of making 
X* less costly relative to ingroup identification I*. Consequently, X* rises and I* falls, which 
both lead to a lower use of stereotypes S*, and hence less discrimination. Thus, affirmative 
action not only raises screening expenditures, but also diminishes the need for identification 
with the ingroup. 
XC
 
C. Robustness 
A limitation of Proposition 5 is that only the result under (e) (and (b) for  holds 
for any specification of utility function  with positive and diminishing marginal 
utility. To get an impression of the sensitiveness of the results to the specification of , 
consider the additive quadratic specification, which has quite different implications from 
those of the power function. When competition increases, risk aversion measure  
then remains constant, and hence, contrary to psychological intuition, SRUC falls due to 
)*)('' 0XRT =
)(ΠΠU
)(ΠΠU
|)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ
                                                 
32 This argument should be modified when some teams in the market consist in majority of outgroup 
members (e.g. women) from the perspective of the dominant ingroup in other teams (e.g. men). Under 
competitive pressure these ‘outgroup’ members may identify with their own ingroup, and hence not 
develop a discriminatory taste against their own ingroup. On the other hand, feelings of inferiority or 
small-sample biases according to the BIAS model of Fiedler (1996; see Sec. II.D) may still lead to a 
stereotypic perception of a lower average productivity of their own ingroup as compared to the 
dominant group (see Schwieren, 2004). These teams would then develop a rising discrimination 
coefficient against their own ingroup. 
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falling p. By the same token, marginal benefits  and  then fall as well, while marginal 
cost  rises. This implies falling screening expenditure X* and, for “not too positive 
”, rising ingroup identification I* for all . As a result, stereotype use  then 
rises for all . Furthermore, for employers with 
XB IB
XC
*)('' XRT S0Πˆ *S
S
0Πˆ 0c II <  the falling qq S ∆∆ −*  again results 
in a U-shape of D* as a function of . Thus, the outcomes are similar to those in the 
power-function case. On the other hand, the results in Proposition 5 are sensitive to relaxing 
the linear approximations made. For example, for a sufficiently (but perhaps implausibly) 
high positive value of , all else equal, increasing competition leads to a falling I* 
and a rising X*, and hence a falling S* and D*. 
S
0Πˆ
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 A rather strong assumption in the basic model made in Section II.A is that there is 
only uncertainty about the marginal team productivity qi of a new team member. This 
assumption can be relaxed by allowing uncertainty in other variables like product price p and 
the productivities of incumbent team members as well. Assuming independence of variances 
of p and productivities and taking a second-order Taylor expansion of  around )(ΠΠU Πˆ  
(see Sec. II.B), additional utility losses due to variances then emerge in eqs. (6)-(8) and (12). 
Just like the utility loss due to , these utility losses are reduced by the certainty 
illusion of ingroup identification I, implying additional marginal benefits of I in eq. (13). By 
raising risk aversion, competitive pressure augments these marginal benefits as well, thus 
reinforcing the rises in I*, and hence in S* and D*, according to Proposition 3.
)|( TqqV
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 Another extension of the model is allowing hiring tests to be biased against outgroup 
members (see Sec. II.A). This complication can be shown to imply similar effects as found in 
the basic model. Finally, our model allows for the possibility that the outgroup is 
stereotypically perceived as having a higher, rather than lower, average productivity q  than 
the ingroup. This may, for instance, occur when a group of women perceives a group of men 
as having a higher average productivity (see Schwieren, 2004, and footnote 32). Increasing 
ingroup identification may raise use and strength of such outgroup-biased stereotypic 
perceptions as well, by reinforcing certainty illusions and feelings of inferiority, respectively. 
 
IV. Experimental and empirical evidence 
Evidence that is consistent with the model in Sec. II is (of course) given by the social-
psychological findings that we wanted to incorporate in our model (see Sec. I). In particular, 
the experimental findings of higher self-relevant uncertainty leading to stronger ingroup 
                                                 
33 On the other hand, these additional uncertainties may also lead to search for information to reduce 
them, which would diminish the reinforcement of the rises in I*, S* and D*. 
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identification, and hence to more stereotyping, prejudices and discrimination (see Secs. II.C 
and D), correspond to the case of zero or at least constant X in our model. An exogenous 
increase in SRUC (interpreted as the pertinent term in eq. (12)) at given I* and X implies a 
rise in marginal benefit  (see eq. (13)), which can be 
associated with a rise in risk aversion . It is therefore predicted to lead to a 
higher I* at given X (see Prop. 2), and hence higher S*, 
))(*)(/(*)('. XRIRIRSRUCB TSSI +=
|)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ
qq S ∆∆ −* , and D*.    
 On the other hand, Tiedens and Linton (2001) find in their experimental study of 
individual decision-making that stronger uncertainty-related emotions lead to a more thorough 
look at the individual information at hand and less reliance on stereotypes.34 In the context of 
our model this corresponds to higher screening expenditure X* and a lower use of stereotypes 
S*. Stronger uncertainty-related emotions are likely to lead to a higher risk aversion 
 or a lower perceived reliability of the individual information  at given 
X*. Both changes imply a higher SRUC (eq. (12)) and are predicted to lead to a higher X* at 
given I (Prop. 1). As far as I may have played a role in the experiments of Tiedens and Linton 
(the context of individualized decision-making made ingroup identification less probable), 
Proposition 3 predicts that I* will rise or fall depending on the sign of  and that X* 
will unambiguously rise. As a result, use of stereotypes S* will indeed fall when  is 
“not too negative” (Prop. 4). 
|)ˆ(''| S0U ΠΠ *)(XRT
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 To test the predictions of the model with respect to competition (Sec. III) an 
experimental study was conducted by Schwieren et al. (2004) for the case where 0=X . 
Equilibrium identification I* then rises as competition strengthens (Prop. 2). The experiments 
used artificial groups, i.e., “blue” and “red”, following the minimal-group paradigm in social 
psychology (Tajfel et al., 1971), and tried to generate a stereotypic perception Sq∆  along the 
lines of Fiedler’s  (1996) BIAS model (see Sec. II.D). The rise in I* was then supposed to 
raise the use S* of this stereotype vis-à-vis the use of indications that there was no real 
difference in average productivity between the ingroup and the outgroup. The experiments 
found weakly significantly higher discrimination coefficients D* as competition was stronger, 
but they tended to be in favor of the outgroup. The latter result is probably related to the 
artificial nature of the group categories, leading to less ingroup identification than can be 
expected for real-life categories. Nevertheless, the effect of a rising S* on D* apparently 
dominated a possible negative income effect via qq S ∆∆ −*  (see Prop. 5.e-f).  
 A study by Schwieren and Glunk (2004) extends the experimental testing to a more 
complex situation, using a business-simulation game, where categories used are real, namely 
                                                 
34 See Tiedens and Linton (2001) also for related social-psychological literature on this subject. 
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different nationalities (Dutch and German). In this case the stereotype that German students 
performed better than Dutch students was realistic, but it was dominated by a strong 
discriminatory taste of Dutch against German students when competition was perceived to be 
strong. Moreover, perceived competition correlated significantly positive with ingroup 
identification. This suggests that ingroup identification can indeed play a major role in raising 
discrimination when competition increases (see Sec. II.D). 
 In an extensive empirical study Boone et al. (2003) find that top executive 
management teams in the newspaper-publisher industry tended to hire more ‘similar’ team 
members and fire more ‘dissimilar’ team members when they had more power vis-à-vis the 
board of directors and competition from alternative media (particularly television) was strong 
(interaction effect). Similarity in their study is not related to sex or race, but rather to other 
demographic characteristics, namely age, career path, industry experience and academic 
status. A major force underlying this “homosocial reproduction” effect of competition may be 
identification of the members of a powerful team with their ingroup (“closing ranks” as 
Boone et al. call it). This may have led to (more) discrimination against the outgroup. 
 Azmat et al. (2003) investigate the possible sources of gender gaps in unemployment 
in OECD countries. Most of their hypotheses find little support in the data, but they find a 
significantly positive interregional correlation of the gender gap with attitudes on whether 
men are more deserving of work than women. Hence, discrimination against women may 
explain part of the large gender gap in the Mediterranean countries. Moreover, there turns out 
to be a weakly significant positive relationship between discriminatory attitude or prejudice 
and overall unemployment rate across regions within European countries.35 This suggests that 
stronger competition on the supply side of the labor market (higher unemployment) may raise 
prejudice as a result of the higher uncertainty it entails and ensuing identification with the 
ingroup (cf. Sec. II.D). In particular, managers who take hiring and pay decisions may be 
affected by this, inducing them to discriminate (more) against women. 
 More indirect indications that psychological identification effects of competition on 
discrimination might be important are given by empirical studies which find no (clear) 
evidence of a suppressing effect of competition in the product market on employer 
discrimination (as predicted by Becker, [1957], 1971). For example, Shepherd & Levin 
                                                 
35 For the data of Azmat et al. we linearly regressed prejudice on unemployment rate in 1996 across 
143 regions, correcting for country-fixed effects. This yielded a weakly significant positive regression 
coefficient (p value 0.065). We are indebted to Maia Güell for kindly informing us about the data 
sources of Azmat et al. and for help with the estimations. 
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(1973) and Oster (1975) do not find market power in the product market to influence 
discrimination, and Baldwin & Johnson (1996) find evidence for discriminatory hiring even if 
it is obviously inefficient (in the presence of competition in the product market). Furthermore, 
Szymanski (2000) and Preston & Szymanski (2000) find evidence in the increasingly 
competitive English soccer league that there was employer discrimination against black 
players despite of clear performance criteria.  
  
V. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a model that integrates two opposite responses to increased feelings 
of uncertainty in hiring and pay decisions, as suggested by social-psychological research. 
Employers may raise their screening expenditures on job applicants, but they may also 
identify more strongly with their ingroup. A simultaneous-equilibrium analysis showed that 
under certain plausible conditions the former response dominates the latter response, leading 
to less stereotyping and discrimination. As an application, the effects of increasing 
competition on the supply side of the product market were analysed. Strengthening 
competition makes the employers feel more uncertain about their profits, but it also has the 
effect of raising the opportunity cost of screening expenditures. This elicits substitution of 
ingroup identification for screening expenditures, and so enhances use of stereotypes, and 
hence discrimination. On a policy-making level, this calls for affirmative action to raise 
screening expenditures, and thus to diminish the need for ingroup identification among 
employers. 
 The main predictions of the model are reasonably robust to different specifications and 
extensions. There is experimental and empirical evidence that supports the implications and 
relevance of the model, but more research should be done to test the predictions. Perhaps, the 
main contribution of this paper is that it integrates an important psychological mechanism into 
a microeconomic discrimination model and shows how this mechanism can dominate the 
familiar economic forces. More specifically, social identification and stereotyping are 
endogenized within a microeconomic model, and this may be of relevance for all domains of 
economic life where these phenomena play an important role.  
 
Appendix A. Comparative statics of X*, I* and S*  
The second-order condition for an interior X*, 0XU XX <*)( , implies 0XBB XXXX <≡ *)(* . 
Since , where  is the marginal benefit of raising '*** TRX RBB = *RB TR  by one unit at *TR , it 
follows that . Substituting eq. (10) into eq. (9) and 
differentiating this utility function with respect to 
0RBRBB TR
2T
RRXX <+= '*'*'***
TR  yields 
 29
2*2
02
1 )(|)ˆ(''|* −+= TSSR RRpUB ΠΠ , and hence . Substituting 
these expressions into the second-order condition then implies . 
1TS
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 The second-order condition for an interior I*, 0IU II <*)( , implies =− ** IIII CB  
 The 
first-order condition  implies  
, and substituting this in the second-order condition yields 
. Since  
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)()('*'*)'*(' ** 0
1TS2SS
0
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'*SR , This inequality is always fulfilled. 
 Differentiating first-order conditions 0=XU  and 0=IU  (omitting *) with respect to 
any exogenous variable Z yields 0IUXUU ZXIZXXXZ =++  and 0IUXUU ZIIZXIZI =++ . 
Writing this system of two equations into Hessian-matrix form and solving it for  and  
by inverting the matrix, we get  and 
, where h is the determinant of the Hessian matrix, which is 
assumed to be positive by virtue of the second-order conditions. Hence, the signs of  and 
 equal the signs of 
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1
Z UUUUhI −= −
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ZI ZIXIXZII UUUU +−  and ZIXXXZIX UUUU − , respectively. 
Elaborating these expressions for Z that raise/lower , ceteris paribus, viz. 
, p, 
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SU ΠΠ SR  and TR , yields =+−−=+− ZIXIXZIIIIZIXIXZII BBBCBUUUU )(  
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 (see above) and , the sign of 
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0'/)('|''| 0 >= SSI RIRU 0RT >' ZIXIXZII UUUU +− , and hence 
of , equals the sign of . Similarly, ZX RZB =−=− IZXXXZIXZIXXXZIX BBBBUUUU  
. Since  and , 
the sign of 
'''')"'(''' 2 SRZ
T
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S
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ST
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ZIXXXZXI UUUU + , and hence of , equals the sign of . Thus, if 
, 
ZI RZ
T BR ''−
0>RZB 0<>ZI  if and only 0'' ><TR . Analogously, if 0<RZB , 0><ZI  if and only 0'' ><TR . 
For 'TRZ = , that raises , but not , ceteris paribus, it follows that XB IB
0' >−=+− TXRIIZIXIXZII BUUUUU  and 0' <=− TXRIXZIXXXZIX BBUUUU , and hence 
 and . Analogously,  and 0
'
>TRX 0' <TRI 0' >SRI 0' <SRX . For Z that raise , ceteris 
paribus, viz.  and m, 
XC
)ˆ(' 0
SU ΠΠ 0<=+− XZIIZIXIXZII CUUUUU  and 
, and so 0>−=− XZIXZIXXXZIX CBUUUU 0<ZX  and . Analogously, for , 
that raises , ceteris paribus, we get 
0>ZI |''| IUZ =
IC 0'|'| <IUI  and . 0'|'| >IUX
Second-order condition  can be shown to be equivalent to 
, which is somewhat stronger than the 
condition for 
0h >
[ 10SS0SSTS2TT IRRIRR2RRR2R −−++< )())(('/'(''' ]
''TR  implied by  (see above), but still allows positive values of 0U XX < ''TR . 
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Stereotyping  rises/falls at an increase in Z if and only if 1)/1( −+= ST RRS
T
Z
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Z
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T
Z
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Z
S RXRRIR /'/' <> . For Z that raise/lower , ceteris paribus, 
 and 
 (see above). Factoring 
out common factors, the condition for 
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The former condition can be rewritten as. 
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> , q.e.d. The signs of  for 
the other Z are straightforward. 
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Appendix B. Effects of competition 
For power function (20) with 0≤ρ , a fall in p and the ensuing fall in  together lead to a 
net rise in self-relevance 
S
0Πˆ
2
02
1 |ˆ(''| pU SΠΠ  of the uncertainty in qi. This follows from 
ρρΠ ΠΠρΠρΠ )ˆ()/ˆ)(1(ˆ)1(|)ˆ(''| 0202202021 SSSS pppU −+− −=−= , which rises when p falls 
since , where Q  is expected output quantity and C is 
production costs
pCQpCQppS0 /ˆ/)ˆ(/ˆ −=−=Π ˆ
36, then falls (neglecting minor changes in  due to changes in ). Qˆ iqˆ
 For power function (20) . Writing , it then 
follows that  is positively proportional to . 
This function of  is easily seen to have a U-shape with minimum point . The 
effects of competition on X* simultaneous with I* are also determined by the feedback from 
I* on X*. Approximating  linearly as , eq. (10) is easily solved for X* 
conditional on I, yielding 
1
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or  if the expression in eq. (B.1) is negative. Next, linear approximation 
allows solving I* simultaneous with X* from eq.  (implied by 
 as 
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S
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When I* is so high as to make the expression for X* in eq. (B.1) negative, eq. (B.2) no longer 
holds and I* becomes conditional on 0X =* . Substituting eq. (B.2) into , and 
the resulting expression into eq. (B.1), yields the formula for the simultaneous . In the 
case of power function (20) the expression for  then varies as , where 
. Combining this with the first term  in 
**)( IIR S β=
0X ≥*
α/*)(IR S ρΠ +−1S02c ˆ
0|))(''|/( 0
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36 These are given by wage costs  plus non-wage costs K. wONwI ∆−
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eq. (B.1), where 0ˆ/)2/()1(1 >−= Qmc αρ , it is easily derived that  is positive 
(negative) if and only if  is greater (smaller) than . A 
graph of these functions then shows that for 
S
0X Πˆ/* ∂∂
CS0 −Πˆ ρΠρ +−−− 21S012 cc12 /ˆ)/)((
21 /<ρ  the “greater-than” inequality, implying 
falling X* as competition increases, may hold for all values of , but there may also be an 
intermediate range of  where the “smaller-than” inequality holds.  
S
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Substituting eq. (B.1) for X* into , it easily follows that ** XRT α=
)/()ˆ(** m2rpRR S0
TS Πα=+ . Substituting eq. (B.2) into , and next substituting 
the expressions for 
** IR S β=
*SR  and ** TS RR +  into , yields )/(* *** TSS RRRS +=
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(if the inequality in eq. (B.1) holds). This expression implies that, for power function (20), S* 
varies with competition in proportion to  
. Differentiating this expression to  yields that 
 is negative (positive) if and only if  is greater (smaller) than 
. A graph of these functions then shows that, for 
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21 /<ρ , the “greater-than” inequality, implying rising S* as competition increases, may hold 
for all values of , but there may also be an intermediate range of  within the interval 
 where the “smaller-than” inequality holds. 
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 In case rationalization makes qq S ∆∆ −  linearly increasing in , substituting 
 and eq. (B.2) for I* into eq. (19) for 
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for  (such that the inequality in eq. (B.1) holds), while for cII >* cII ≤*  S0S qqq ∆∆∆ =−* . 
Eq. (B.4) implies that, for , 0c II ≠ qq S ∆∆ −*  varies with competition in proportion to 
, and hence for power function (20) in proportion to . By virtue of eq. 
(B.4) this contributes a factor of the form  to the variation of discrimination 
coefficient 
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)(** * qqSD S ∆∆ −=  with competition, where  if  and 03 >c 0c II < 03 <c  if 
. Coefficient D* then varies in proportion to 
. Writing out the numerator and 
differentiating to  yields that  is negative (positive) if and only if 
 is greater (smaller) than 
. 
Graphs of these functions for  and 
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03 >c 03 <c  then show for 21 /<ρ : For  the 
“greater-than” inequality, implying rising D* as competition increases, holds for sufficiently 
low values of , and the “smaller-than” inequality, implying falling D*, holds for 
sufficiently high values of , but there may also be an intermediate range of , 
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including , where D* first rises as competition increases and then falls. For CS =0Πˆ 03 <c  
we have the same result as for S*, but now the possible intermediate range of  where D* 
falls is less “probable”. 
S
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